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FAKE ARBITRATION: WHY FLORIDA’S NONBINDING
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE IS NOT ARBITRATION WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Andrew Daechsel*
Abstract
Does the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) govern Florida’s nonbinding
arbitration procedure? At present, this question is unresolved. As its name
suggests, the FAA generally governs arbitration agreements. But the
FAA does not define “arbitration,” and the U.S. Courts of Appeals have
different standards for what constitutes arbitration under the FAA. This
Note discusses those different standards and argues that the Eleventh
Circuit provides the most logical test for determining whether a particular
dispute resolution procedure is FAA arbitration. Finally, this Note argues
that, under the Eleventh Circuit’s standard, Florida’s nonbinding
arbitration procedure is not FAA arbitration.
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INTRODUCTION
This Note analyzes whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
governs Florida’s dispute resolution procedure called “nonbinding
arbitration.” The FAA generally governs the enforceability of parties’
written agreements to arbitrate disputes.1 However, the FAA does not
define “arbitration.”2 Thus, it is unclear whether the FAA governs
agreements to submit disputes to Florida’s nonbinding arbitration
procedure.3 This issue is significant because, if the FAA governs
nonbinding arbitration agreements, then courts will almost always
enforce them regardless of their unenforceability on other grounds.
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions dealing with various arbitration
agreements make this clear.4
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has not decided
whether the FAA governs Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure. In
Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione International, Inc.,5 the
Eleventh Circuit addressed the enforceability “of a contract clause
requiring an aggrieved party, prior to filing a lawsuit, to institute
mediation or non-binding arbitration.”6 The court stated, “[I]f either
mediation or non-binding arbitration is not FAA ‘arbitration,’ [the]
agreement is not enforceable under the FAA.”7 The court ultimately held
that the FAA did not compel enforcement of mediation agreements, so
the court “reserve[d] for another day whether non-binding arbitration is
1. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
2. Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he FAA does not define its key term, ‘arbitration,’ and courts have had a difficult
time defining just what types of procedures are enforceable under the statute.”).
3. See, e.g., 1 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE GUIDE § 6:4 (Westlaw
subscription required) (“[T]here is some debate whether the FAA applies to ‘nonbinding
arbitration.’”).
4. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“[O]ur
cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration. They have
repeatedly described the Act as ‘embod[ying] [a] national policy favoring arbitration,’ and ‘a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary.’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) and Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))).
5. 524 F.3d 1235.
6. Id. at 1236.
7. Id. at 1238.
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within the scope of the FAA.”8
While the Eleventh Circuit did not decide whether nonbinding
arbitration is within the scope of the FAA, it did state a bright-line rule
outlining the characteristics of a dispute resolution procedure that meets
the definition of arbitration under the FAA.9 The court also looked to the
FAA’s statutory purposes to justify its decision.10 Based on the Eleventh
Circuit’s bright-line rule and reasoning in Advanced Bodycare, this Note
argues that Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure is not within the
scope of the FAA.
Part I of this Note gives a brief overview of the FAA. Part II
chronologically discusses how different courts have addressed the issue
of whether nonbinding arbitration is arbitration within the scope of the
FAA. Based on that case law and how other credible sources define
arbitration, this Note argues that the Eleventh Circuit has developed the
best test to determine whether the FAA governs a particular dispute
resolution procedure. Finally, Part III describes Florida’s nonbinding
arbitration procedure, analyzes whether it is arbitration within the scope
of the FAA, and discusses the importance of resolving this issue.
I. WHAT IS THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT?
For much of U.S. history, most federal and state courts strongly
disfavored enforcing arbitration agreements.11 Under the “revocability
doctrine,” many courts allowed parties to get out of arbitration
agreements if one party to the agreement no longer wished to arbitrate.12
This doctrine prevailed because many courts felt that contracts should not
prevent parties from accessing the courts.13 Eventually, businesses
became disenchanted with courts’ refusal to enforce arbitration
agreements and lobbied for change.14 In response to this lobbying,
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925.15
8. Id. at 1240–41.
9. Id. at 1239.
10. Id. at 1239–40.
11. Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 98 (2012).
12. Id. at 98–99.
13. Id. at 99.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 99–100; see also Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to offset the ‘hostility of American courts to the enforcement
of arbitration agreements.’” (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111
(2001))); Sergio J. Campos, Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1573,
1621 (2012) (“The FAA was passed primarily to curb ‘widespread judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements.’” (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011)));
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Penumbra: Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing
Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 NEV. L.J. 427, 433 (2007).
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Section 2 is the key provision of the FAA.16 It states that the FAA
governs written agreements to arbitrate disputes that arise from “any
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce.”17 Further, section 2 declares that such agreements are “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”18
In passing the FAA, Congress sought to place arbitration agreements
on “the same footing as other contracts.”19 Despite Congress’s innocuous
intentions, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA has greatly
empowered arbitration agreements.20 Instead of enforcing arbitration
agreements as traditional contracts, the Court has used the FAA to turn
arbitration agreements into “super contracts.”21
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES “FAA ARBITRATION”?
The FAA clearly governs arbitration agreements. However, arguing
that an arbitration agreement is governed by the FAA because it is an
arbitration agreement simply begs the question: What is arbitration?
Since the FAA does not define this key term, courts have had to do so.
The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have struggled in this endeavor and
have reached disparate conclusions regarding what constitutes FAA
arbitration. 22 The Supreme Court has not resolved this disparity.
To analyze whether Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure
qualifies as FAA arbitration, one must first answer the question: What is
FAA arbitration? Answering this question is essentially a matter of
statutory interpretation—interpreting the meaning of arbitration as used
in the FAA. When interpreting statutory text, courts generally start with
the plain meaning of the text.23 One statutory interpretation guide
suggests looking first to primary sources such as case law to define
statutory terms.24 After looking at primary sources, one can look to
secondary sources such as dictionaries to interpret specific words.25
16. Wilson, supra note 11, at 100.
17. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
18. Id.
19. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
20. Wilson, supra note 11, at 97.
21. Id.
22. Steven C. Bennett, Non-Binding Arbitration: An Introduction, DISP. RESOL. J.,
May/July 2006, at 1, 5 n.9, available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/266ff34903e1-4610-a7c1-6cd0f951e8bb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1d047cae-3d31-4b6b-b28071ed96efa8e5/Bennett,%20Steven%5B2%5D.pdf (“There are conflicting decisions on the
applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act to non-binding arbitration.”).
23. E.g., KATHARINE CLARK & MATTHEW CONNOLLY, A GUIDE TO READING, INTERPRETING
AND APPLYING STATUTES 3 (2006), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/
academic-programs/legal-writing-scholarship/writing-center/upload/statutoryinterpretation.pdf.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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Accordingly, this Part seeks to determine the correct standard for what
qualifies as FAA arbitration. To do so, this Part first considers how courts
have defined FAA arbitration, especially in cases that analyze whether
nonbinding arbitration is FAA arbitration. Second, it considers how
dictionaries and other credible secondary sources define arbitration.
Based on this analysis, this Part concludes by proposing what courts
should adopt as the correct definition of FAA arbitration.
A. Judicial Interpretations of FAA Arbitration
When interpreting a federal statutory term, courts can look to either
federal or state common law to define the term, depending on the
situation.26 However, the general rule is that courts will apply federal
common law to interpret a federal statute unless Congress has clearly
indicated that courts should do otherwise.27 The circuit courts are split on
whether to define FAA arbitration using state or federal common law.28
Four circuits have held that federal common law applies, while two
circuits have held that state common law applies.29 In addition to the four
circuits that favor using federal common law, the Eleventh Circuit relied
on case law solely from federal courts to interpret FAA arbitration in
Advanced Bodycare, despite not explicitly stating that the federal
common law applies.30 This reliance suggests that the Eleventh Circuit
also favors federal common law.
This Note assumes that federal common law dictates the definition of
FAA arbitration for three reasons. First, more circuits have applied
federal common law. Second, the circuits that favor federal common law
have provided more compelling explanations to support their conclusion

26. See Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London Issuing Certificate No.
0510135, 707 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit looks to federal common law for the definition of “arbitration” under the FAA, but
acknowledging the differing approaches taken by other federal appellate courts, such as the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which looks to state law), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 155
(2013).
27. Id.
28. E.g., id. (citing Evanston Ins. Co. v. Cogswell Props., LLC, 683 F.3d 684, 693 (6th Cir.
2012), and decisions of other circuit courts).
29. Id. (holding for the Second Circuit “that federal common law provides the definition of
‘arbitration’ under the FAA” and noting that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Sixth, and
Tenth Circuits have applied federal common law, while the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits have applied state common law); see also, e.g., Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co.
v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 688–89 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding for the Tenth Circuit
that federal common law dictates the definition of FAA arbitration).
30. See Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1239–40
(11th Cir. 2008) (using only federal case law to define a standard for determining whether a
dispute resolution procedure is FAA arbitration).
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than those that favor state law.31 For example, “[t]he circuits that apply
federal common law have relied on congressional intent to create a
uniform national arbitration policy.”32 Contrarily, “the circuits that apply
state law have ‘articulated few reasons for doing so.’”33 Furthermore,
“[a]pplying state law would create ‘a patchwork in which the FAA will
mean one thing in one state and something else in another.’”34 Third, the
Eleventh Circuit appears to favor applying the federal common law.35
Because this Note addresses Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure, it
follows the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to resolve the circuit split.
Since this Note assumes that federal common law dictates the
definition of FAA arbitration, the following Subsections summarize
federal case law that addresses whether nonbinding arbitration is FAA
arbitration. The first case, AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,36 is from the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Even though
AMF is not an appellate decision, this Note considers it first because
many appellate courts have relied on AMF to determine whether
nonbinding arbitration is FAA arbitration.37 The other cases all come
from the circuit courts.
1. The Eastern District of New York
In AMF, the Eastern District of New York held that the following
nonbinding dispute resolution procedure was FAA arbitration.38 The
parties (two companies) agreed to submit disputes to an advisory third
party.39 The third party would consider the dispute and issue an advisory
opinion that did not bind either party.40 Notably, the agreement did not
mention the word arbitration.41 Despite this omission, the court held that
the dispute resolution procedure “should be characterized as one to
arbitrate.”42
31. See Bakoss, 707 F.3d at 144 (“We agree with the compelling analysis of the circuits that
have followed federal law in defining the scope of ‘arbitration’ under the FAA.” (emphasis
added)).
32. Id. at 143.
33. Id. at 144 (quoting Liberty Mut. Grp., Inc. v. Wright, No. DKC 12-0282, 2012 WL
718857, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 5, 2012)).
34. Id. (quoting Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n, 218 F.3d 1085,
1091 (9th Cir. 2000) (Tashima, J., concurring)).
35. See Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239–40 (using only federal case law to define a
standard for determining whether a dispute resolution procedure is FAA arbitration).
36. 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
37. E.g., Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A, 111 F.3d 343, 349–50 (3d Cir. 1997);
see also, e.g., Wosley, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1208–09 (9th Cir. 1998).
38. AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 460–61.
39. Id. at 457–58.
40. Id. at 458.
41. See id. at 457–59.
42. Id. at 460.
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In its decision, the court stated the following general rule: “If the
parties have agreed to submit a dispute for a decision by a third party,
they have agreed to arbitration. The arbitrator’s decision need not be
binding. . . .”43 In analyzing whether the parties’ particular dispute
resolution procedure qualified as FAA arbitration, the court focused on
whether the procedure would “settle” the parties’ dispute and thus
“provide an effective alternative to litigation.”44 Even though the third
party’s opinion would not bind either party, the court held that “[v]iewed
in the light of reasonable commercial expectations the dispute will be
settled by this arbitration.”45 The court likely found support for
“reasonable commercial expectations” in its conclusion that “[v]oluntary
compliance with [the third-party advisor’s] decisions has been
universal.”46
2. The Third Circuit
In Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A.,47 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the following dispute resolution
procedure found in an agreement between Nissan and its customers was
not FAA arbitration.48 According to the agreement, before the customer
could file a civil suit, the customer had to submit the dispute to
mediation.49 If the parties could not resolve the dispute in mediation, they
would next submit it to arbitration.50 But the arbitrator’s decision only
bound the parties if the customer approved.51 Hence, the arbitration was
binding for one party and nonbinding for the other. If the parties did not
resolve the dispute within forty days of submitting the claim, the
customer had fulfilled its obligation under the dispute resolution
procedure and could file a civil claim.52
In its opinion, the Third Circuit referenced AMF’s rule that “[i]f the
parties have agreed to submit a dispute for a decision by a third party,
they have agreed to arbitration.”53 However, the Third Circuit narrowed
this rule somewhat, adding the requirement that the parties agree to
arbitrate their dispute all the way to the arbitrator’s issuance of a

43. Id.
44. Id. at 460–61.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 458.
47. 111 F.3d 343 (3d Cir. 1997).
48. Id. at 346, 351.
49. Id. at 345–46.
50. Id. at 346.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 345–46.
53. Id. at 350 (quoting AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y.
1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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decision.54 In other words, if the dispute resolution procedure allows the
parties to submit their dispute to traditional litigation before the arbitrator
has issued a decision, then the dispute resolution procedure is not FAA
arbitration.55
The Third Circuit reasoned that the dispute resolution procedure in
this case was not FAA arbitration mainly because parties would not
arbitrate many claims to their conclusion.56 Since many plaintiffs would
be able to file a civil claim after forty days elapsed, the dispute resolution
procedure would not proceed to an arbitrator’s final decision in a number
of cases.57 Therefore, the procedure was not FAA arbitration.
3. The Ninth Circuit
In Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc.,58 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit addressed for the first time whether nonbinding
arbitration was FAA arbitration.59 The Ninth Circuit held that the
following three-step dispute resolution procedure was FAA arbitration.60
First, the parties would meet and attempt to resolve the dispute.61 If that
failed, the parties would attempt to resolve the dispute in nonbinding
arbitration.62 If nonbinding arbitration also failed, the parties would
litigate the dispute in federal court.63
The Ninth Circuit used AMF and Harrison to formulate a standard for
determining whether nonbinding arbitration constitutes FAA
arbitration.64 The court referred to AMF’s ruling that “parties agree to
submit to arbitration under the FAA when they ‘agree[ ] to submit a
dispute for a decision by a third party.’”65 Referencing Harrison, the
Ninth Circuit added that, “according to the Third Circuit’s analysis, the
parties must not only agree to submit the dispute to a third party, but also
agree not to pursue litigation ‘until the process is completed.’”66 The
54. Id. (“[T]he essence of arbitration, we think, is that, when the parties agree to submit
their disputes to it, they have agreed to arbitrate these disputes through to completion, i.e. to an
award made by a third-party arbitrator.”).
55. Id. (“Arbitration does not occur until the process is completed and the arbitrator makes
a decision.”).
56. Id. at 351.
57. Id.
58. 144 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998).
59. Id. at 1207–09.
60. Id. at 1206, 1209.
61. Id. at 1206.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 1208–09.
65. Id. at 1208 (alteration in original) (quoting AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp.
456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
66. Id. (quoting Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 111 F.3d 343, 350 (3d Cir.
1997)).
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Ninth Circuit also noted that neither AMF nor Harrison “held that the
arbitrator[s’] decision must be binding for the FAA to apply.”67
Based on this standard, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the dispute
resolution procedure at issue was FAA arbitration because it: (1) “clearly
provide[d] for the submission of claims to ‘a third party’”68 and (2) “d[id]
not explicitly permit one of the parties to ‘seek recourse to the courts’
after submitting claims for non-binding arbitration but before the ‘process
is completed and the arbitrator makes a decision.’”69 Additionally, the
court noted, “A final factor weighing in favor of viewing the dispute
resolution procedures . . . as ‘arbitration’ is the presumption in favor of
arbitrability created by the FAA.”70
4. The Fourth Circuit
In United States v. Bankers Insurance Co.,71 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that the following dispute resolution procedure
was FAA arbitration.72 A federal government agency and a private
business agreed to arbitrate disputes that arose between them.73 However,
the arbitrator’s decision was only binding if the government agency
approved it.74 In other words, the arbitration was binding for one party
and nonbinding for the other party.
The Fourth Circuit did not definitively state the standard it used to
determine whether the dispute resolution procedure was FAA
arbitration.75 Referencing Wolsey and Harrison, the Fourth Circuit first
stated, “Some courts have chosen to focus on whether the arbitration
process is likely to resolve the issues, and whether the parties ‘agree not
to pursue litigation until the process is completed.’”76 Next, referencing
AMF, the Fourth Circuit stated, “In evaluating a similar issue, [the
Eastern District of New York] observed, ‘The arbitrator’s decision need
not be binding . . . [as long as there are] reasonable commercial
expectations [that] the dispute will be settled by this arbitration.’”77 These
brief statements were the extent of the court’s explanation of a rule for
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1209 (quoting AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 460).
69. Id. (quoting Harrison, 111 F.3d at 350).
70. Id.
71. 245 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2001).
72. Id. at 317–25.
73. Id. at 317–18.
74. Id. (providing the specific text of the arbitration agreement, which stated that the
arbitrator’s decision was “binding upon approval by the [government agency]” (emphasis
added)).
75. See id. at 322–23.
76. Id. at 322 (quoting Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir.
1998)).
77. Id. (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting AMF Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460–61 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
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whether nonbinding arbitration is FAA arbitration.
The Fourth Circuit then conducted a brief two-paragraph analysis in
which it acknowledged the legitimate possibility that the dispute
resolution procedure might not resolve the parties’ dispute.78 Despite this
possibility, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “because the [government
agency] would presumably act reasonably and rationally, and would
approve an arbitration award or decision that it found favorable, we are
unable to conclude that arbitration proceedings would be futile.”79
5. The Third Circuit Strikes Again
In Dluhos v. Strasberg,80 the Third Circuit again analyzed whether
nonbinding arbitration is FAA arbitration.81 The Third Circuit held that
the dispute resolution procedure in this case was also not FAA
arbitration.82 The contract at issue required one party “to submit to a
‘mandatory administrative proceeding’ before an approved dispute
resolution service provider to resolve” certain disputes.83 Despite
contractual language asserting that the dispute resolution procedure was
mandatory, the contract allowed parties to bring claims in court without
participating in the dispute resolution procedure.84
The Third Circuit did not articulate a general standard for what
constitutes FAA arbitration, but it did shed more light on what the correct
analysis would entail. In explaining the concept of FAA arbitration, the
Third Circuit first restated its previous conclusion from Harrison:
[T]he essence of arbitration . . . is that, when the parties agree
to submit their disputes to it, they have agreed to arbitrate
these disputes through to completion, i.e. to an award made
by a third-party arbitrator. Arbitration does not occur until
the process is completed and the arbitrator makes a
decision.85
But the Third Circuit then went on to minimize this rule saying,
“Admittedly, this definition does little to assist us in determining which
types of dispute resolution fall under the FAA and which do not.”86
The Third Circuit seemed much more concerned with whether, in light
of reasonable commercial expectations, the dispute resolution procedure
78. Id. at 322–23.
79. Id. at 323.
80. 321 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2003).
81. Id. at 366, 370.
82. Id. at 373.
83. Id. at 367 (quoting the relevant dispute resolution policy).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 369–70 (quoting Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 11 F.3d 343, 350 (3d
Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. at 370.
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would resolve the dispute (referencing AMF).87 The Third Circuit’s
reasoning further shows the importance of the dispute resolution
procedure’s finality because each of the three reasons supporting its
decision included the concept of finality.88
6. The Tenth Circuit
In Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Co. v. Management Planning, Inc.,89
two media companies entered into an option agreement giving one of the
media companies the future option to purchase a newspaper owned by
the other.90 The option agreement contained a rather complicated
procedure for resolving any disputes between the parties related to the
fair market value of the newspaper.91 Eventually, the parties ended up in
court, and the issue arose as to whether this procedure was FAA
arbitration.92 To determine whether this dispute resolution procedure was
FAA arbitration, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit focused
on whether the procedure would definitively settle the parties’ dispute,
not whether the procedure was likely to resolve the dispute.93 Because the
procedure would not definitively settle the parties’ dispute, the Tenth
Circuit held that it was not FAA arbitration.94
7. The Eleventh Circuit
In Advanced Bodycare, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly held that the
FAA does not govern mediation.95 While the court did not decide whether

87. See id. at 371–72.
88. First, the Third Circuit stated that the dispute resolution procedure “obviously
contemplates the possibility of judicial intervention, as no provision of the policy prevents a party
from filing suit before, after or during the administrative proceedings. . . . In that sense, this
mechanism would not fall under the FAA because ‘the dispute will [not necessarily] be settled by
this arbitration.’” Id. at 371 (alteration in original) (quoting AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F.
Supp. 456, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)). Second, the Third Circuit stated that the dispute resolution
procedure resolves a “dispute only to the extent that a season-finale cliffhanger resolves a sitcom’s
storyline—that is, it doesn’t.” Id at 372. Third, the Third Circuit noted that the dispute resolution
procedure clearly allowed the parties to seek judicial review of the third party’s decision;
therefore, “the FAA, which applies only to binding proceedings likely to realistically settle the
dispute,” did not govern the dispute resolution procedure. Id. at 372–73 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
89. 390 F.3d 684 (10th Cir. 2004).
90. Id. 686–87.
91. Id. at 687.
92. Id. at 686.
93. Id. at 689–91.
94. Id. at 690–91.
95. Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th
Cir. 2008) (holding that mediation “is not ‘arbitration’ within the meaning of the FAA”).
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nonbinding arbitration is FAA arbitration,96 it did set forth guidelines for
determining whether a particular dispute resolution procedure is FAA
arbitration. These guidelines are very useful in determining whether
nonbinding arbitration in Florida is FAA arbitration.
When determining whether a particular dispute resolution procedure
constitutes FAA arbitration, the Eleventh Circuit will consider whether
the procedure possesses the common factors of traditional arbitration,
which include “(i) an independent adjudicator, (ii) who applies
substantive legal standards . . . , (iii) considers evidence and argument
(however formally or informally) from each party, and (iv) renders a
decision that purports to resolve the rights and duties of the parties,
typically by awarding damages or equitable relief.”97 This is a flexible
test because “[t]he presence or absence of any one of these circumstances
will not always be determinative.”98
In deciding Advanced Bodycare, the Eleventh Circuit focused mainly
on the fourth factor and set forth the following bright-line rule regarding
that factor: “If a dispute resolution procedure does not produce some type
of award that can be meaningfully confirmed, modified, or vacated by a
court upon proper motion, it is not arbitration within the scope of the
FAA.”99 This rule, and the reasoning behind it, is particularly useful in
determining whether nonbinding arbitration in Florida is FAA arbitration.
The court justified its bright-line rule with the FAA’s statutory
purposes. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit noted, “The purpose of the
FAA is to ‘relieve congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an
alternative method of dispute resolution that is speedier and less costly
than litigation.’”100 The FAA’s purpose will only be met if the dispute
resolution procedure in question “is an alternative to litigation, not an
additional layer in a protracted contest.”101 Therefore, it only makes sense
for the FAA to govern a particular dispute resolution procedure if that
procedure produces some sort of meaningful, final award.102 The
96. Id. at 1240–41 (“[W]e reserve for another day whether non-binding arbitration is within
the scope of the FAA.” (emphasis omitted)).
97. Id. at 1239.
98. Id.
99. Id. It is important to note, however, that the inverse of this rule is not true. Id. at 1239
n.3 (“The inverse is not true, however. The presence of an award does not by itself make a
procedure ‘arbitration’ if the procedures that produce the award bear no resemblance to classic
arbitration. The parties could not contract for a binding coin flip, with the winner to receive an
award of his choice, and expect the agreement to be enforced under the FAA.”).
100. Id. at 1239–40 (quoting AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc.,
508 F.3d 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 2007)).
101. Id. at 1240 (quoting B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 907
(11th Cir. 2006), abrogation recognized by Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d 1195,
1197 (11th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. at 1239.
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Eleventh Circuit has noted that “the FAA presumes that the arbitration
process itself will produce a resolution independent of the parties’
acquiescence—an award which declares the parties’ rights and which
may be confirmed with the force of a judgment.”103 If the dispute
resolution procedure in question does not bind a party, then compelling a
party to partake in that procedure under the FAA may very well run
counter to the FAA’s goals.104 That is, forced participation in arbitration
may increase the amount of time and money spent resolving the
dispute.105
B. The Plain Meaning of “Arbitration”
In addition to looking at case law when interpreting statutory text, it
is also useful to consider secondary sources, such as dictionaries.106 This
Section examines how credible sources define arbitration. It does so by
considering definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary, the American
Arbitration Association,107 and the World Intellectual Property
Organization.108 Considering definitions from these sources clarifies
three important characteristics of arbitration: (1) it produces a final and
binding decision, (2) it is an alternative to litigation, and (3) one or more
neutral third parties govern the proceeding.
First, arbitration clearly refers to dispute resolution procedures that
produce a final and binding decision. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
arbitration as “[a] method of dispute resolution . . . whose decision is
binding.”109 Likewise, the American Arbitration Association states that
“[a]rbitration is the submission of a dispute . . . for a final and binding

103. Id. at 1240.
104. Id.
105. Id. (“Unlike submitting a dispute to a private adjudicator, which the FAA contemplates,
compelling a party to submit to settlement talks it does not wish to enter and which cannot resolve
the dispute of their own force may well increase the time and treasure spent in litigation.”
(emphasis omitted)).
106. See CLARK & CONNOLLY, supra note 23, at 4–5.
107. The American Arbitration Association “was founded in 1926, following enactment of
the Federal Arbitration Act, with the specific goal of helping to implement arbitration as an outof-court solution to resolving disputes.” AAA Mission and Principles, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about/mission (last visited May 1, 2015). Additionally, the
American Arbitration Association “has a long history and experience in the field of alternative
dispute resolution, providing services to individuals and organizations who wish to resolve
conflicts out of court.” About the American Arbitration Association (AAA), AM. ARBITRATION
ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about (last visited May 1, 2015).
108. The World Intellectual Property Organization is “a self-funding agency of the United
Nations, with 188 member states” and “is the global forum for intellectual property services,
policy, information and cooperation.” Inside WIPO, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited May 1, 2015).
109. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
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decision, known as an ‘award.’”110 The World Intellectual Property
Organization agrees that arbitration produces a final and binding
decision.111 The only indication that arbitration could possibly refer to a
decision that does not produce a final and binding decision comes from
the American Arbitration Association’s statement that “[a]wards . . . are
generally final and binding on the parties in the case.”112
Second, arbitration clearly refers to dispute resolution mechanisms
that are alternatives to courtroom litigation. The American Arbitration
Association states that arbitration is a “cost-effective alternative to
litigation.”113 Similarly, the World Intellectual Property Organization
notes that “[i]n choosing arbitration, the parties opt for a private dispute
resolution procedure instead of going to court.”114
Finally, arbitration refers to dispute resolution mechanisms that
neutral third parties govern. Black’s Law Dictionary defines arbitration
as “[a] method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third
parties.”115 The American Arbitration Association states that
“[a]rbitration is the submission of a dispute to one or more impartial
persons.”116
C. The Correct Interpretation of FAA Arbitration
This Note argues that the Eleventh Circuit has created the best
standard for determining whether a particular dispute resolution
procedure constitutes FAA arbitration. Specifically, it suggests that
courts should follow the Eleventh Circuit’s four-factor test and the brightline rule related to the fourth factor of that test. Therefore, in the following
Part, this Note uses the Eleventh Circuit’s standard to analyze whether
Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure is FAA arbitration.
In Wolsey, the Ninth Circuit built on the reasoning of the Third Circuit
and the Eastern District of New York to conclude that the dispute
resolution procedure at issue was FAA arbitration.117 However, the court
missed the mark in that case because it focused too much on whether the
dispute resolution procedure provided for submission of the claim to a
third party and not enough on whether the procedure would produce a
110. Arbitration, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/
disputeresolutionservices/arbitration (last visited May 1, 2015) (emphasis added).
111. The World Intellectual Property Organization states that arbitration produces “a binding
decision on the dispute.” What Is Arbitration?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/what-is-arb.html (last visited May 1, 2015) (emphasis
added).
112. Arbitration, supra note 110 (emphasis added).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. See What Is Arbitration?, supra note 111 (emphasis added).
115. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 109 (emphasis added).
116. Arbitration, supra note 110 (emphasis added).
117. Supra Subsection II.A.3.
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final decision.118 The Eleventh Circuit’s standard places more emphasis
on whether the dispute resolution procedure produces a final decision.119
Given the FAA’s purpose of increasing the efficiency of dispute
resolution and ensuring that arbitration is “‘an alternative to litigation, not
an additional layer in a protracted contest,’”120 the Eleventh Circuit’s
final decision standard is superior and better determines whether a
particular dispute resolution procedure is FAA arbitration.
It also seems that the Ninth Circuit missed the mark in Wolsey with its
reasoning that the dispute resolution procedure in question should be
FAA arbitration because the FAA creates a presumption in favor of
arbitration.121 Although there is no question that the FAA creates a
presumption in favor of arbitration,122 it seems that the court misapplied
this presumption. The presumption appears to favor enforcing
agreements to arbitrate when it is clear that the parties agreed to undergo
arbitration as governed by the FAA. Thus, when the parties have actually
agreed to FAA arbitration, courts should presume that the agreement
itself is enforceable or that the dispute or controversy at issue is within
the scope of the agreement. It does not mean, however, that where it is
unclear whether the parties agreed to a dispute resolution procedure
within the scope of the FAA the court should presume that the dispute
resolution procedure actually is FAA arbitration.
III. DOES THE FAA GOVERN FLORIDA’S NONBINDING
ARBITRATION?
Now that this Note has determined (or at least argued for) the correct
meaning of FAA arbitration, it can address its ultimate question: Does the
FAA govern Florida’s nonbinding arbitration? In other words, is
Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure FAA arbitration? To answer
this question, this Part first describes Florida’s nonbinding arbitration
procedure. Next, this Part uses the Eleventh Circuit’s standard for FAA
arbitration123 to analyze whether the FAA governs Florida’s nonbinding
arbitration procedure. This Part concludes by describing the importance
of resolving whether the FAA governs Florida’s nonbinding arbitration
procedure.

118. See Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1208–09 (9th Cir. 1998).
119. See supra Subsection II.A.7.
120. Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1239–40 (11th
Cir. 2008) (quoting B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 907 (11th Cir.
2006), abrogation recognized by Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d 1195, 1197 (11th
Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See Wolsey, 144 F.3d at 1209.
122. E.g., id.
123. Supra Subsection II.A.7.
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A. Florida’s Nonbinding Arbitration Procedure
In Florida, nonbinding arbitration is a statutorily defined process
governed by Florida Statutes § 44.103 and Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure 1.800 and 1.820.124 Florida Statutes § 44.103(1) authorizes the
Florida Supreme Court to establish “rules of practice and procedure” for
conducting nonbinding arbitration.125 The Florida Supreme Court has
done so in Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.800 and 1.820.126
In Florida, a chief arbitrator runs the nonbinding arbitration
proceeding.127 Before the proceeding, the arbitration tribunal sends a
notice of arbitration to the parties explaining the nonbinding arbitration
procedures.128
Compared to a traditional trial, nonbinding arbitration is relatively
informal.129 The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure instruct parties to
minimize witness testimony.130 Instead, the parties’ attorneys do most of
the talking.131 Additionally, parties have a strong incentive to appear:
even if a party is not present, “the chief arbitrator may proceed with the
hearing and the arbitration panel shall render a decision based upon the
facts and circumstances as presented by the parties present.”132
Typically, the parties have thirty days to complete the proceeding.133
If the parties need more time, they or the chief arbitrator may move for
an extension.134 At most, the court can grant the parties an additional
thirty days to arbitrate.135 Therefore, even with an extension, the parties
must complete the proceeding within sixty days of the first proceeding.136
After the proceeding concludes, the arbitrator issues a decision
regarding the dispute.137 If there is a panel of arbitrators, a majority vote
124. See Daniel Morman & Jonathan Whitcomb, Navigating the Nonbinding Arbitration
Minefield in Florida, FLA. B.J., May 2007, at 18, available at http://www.floridabar.org/
divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Author/A850836D44B9279E852572C90056C2BD.
125. FLA. STAT. § 44.103 (2013).
126. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.800 (detailing exclusions from arbitration); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820
(detailing hearing procedures for nonbinding arbitration).
127. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(a).
128. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(b)(1)–(2).
129. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(c).
130. Id. (“Presentation of testimony shall be kept to a minimum.”).
131. Id. (“[M]atters shall be presented to the arbitrator(s) primarily through the statements
and arguments of counsel.”).
132. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(e).
133. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(g)(1).
134. Id. (“Arbitration shall be completed within 30 days of the first arbitration hearing unless
extended by order of the court on motion of the chief arbitrator or of a party.”).
135. Id.
136. Id. (“No extension of time shall be for a period exceeding 60 days from the date of the
first arbitration hearing.”).
137. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(g)(2) (“Upon the completion of the arbitration process, the
arbitrator(s) shall render a decision.”).
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determines the outcome.138 The arbitrator must notify the parties of the
decision in writing no later than ten days after the proceeding
concludes.139 The arbitrator’s written decision may “set forth the issues
in controversy and the arbitrator(’s)(s’) conclusions and findings of fact
and law.”140 Finally, “[t]he arbitrator(’s)(s’) decision and the originals of
any transcripts shall be sealed and filed with the clerk at the time the
parties are notified of the decision.”141
As the name nonbinding arbitration suggests, the arbitrator’s decision
is not necessarily final. After the arbitrator issues the decision, parties
may move for a new trial.142 However, parties must do so no later than
twenty days after service of the decision.143 After twenty days, the
decision is final.144
Florida Statutes § 44.103 seems to encourage parties to move for a
new trial only if they think the arbitrator’s decision is significantly unfair.
Specifically, § 44.103 authorizes the court, upon a motion by either party,
to “assess costs against the party requesting a [new] trial.”145 These costs
include “arbitration costs, court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and
other reasonable costs.”146
When the plaintiff requests a new trial, there are other potential
consequences. If the plaintiff “obtains a judgment at trial which is at least
25 percent less than the arbitration award,”147 then “the costs and
attorney’s fees . . . shall be set off against the award.”148 Further, “[w]hen
the costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to this section total more than the
amount of the judgment, the court shall enter judgment for the defendant
against the plaintiff for the amount of the costs and attorney’s fees, less
the amount of the award to the plaintiff.”149 When the court is
determining whether to assess costs against the plaintiff, “the term
‘judgment’ means the amount of the net judgment entered, plus all
138. Id. (“In the case of a panel, a decision shall be final upon a majority vote of the panel.”).
139. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(g)(3) (“Within 10 days of the final adjournment of the arbitration
hearing, the arbitrator(s) shall notify the parties, in writing, of their decision.”).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See FLA. STAT. § 44.103(5) (2013); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(h).
143. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(h).
144. Id. (providing that if the parties do not meet the twenty-day deadline, “the [arbitrator’s]
decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as
may be required to carry out the terms of the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida
Statutes”).
145. FLA. STAT. § 44.103(6).
146. Id. These “reasonable costs” include, but are not limited to, “investigation expenses and
expenses for expert or other testimony which were incurred after the arbitration hearing and
continuing through the trial of the case in accordance with the guidelines for taxation of costs as
adopted by the Supreme Court.” Id.
147. Id. § 44.103(6)(a).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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taxable costs pursuant to the guidelines for taxation of costs as adopted
by the Supreme Court.”150 It also includes “any postarbitration collateral
source payments received or due as of the date of the judgment, and plus
any postarbitration settlement amounts by which the verdict was
reduced.”151
When the defendant moves for a new trial, there are also potential
consequences if the “judgment entered against the defendant . . . is at least
25 percent more than the arbitration award.”152 In such a situation, “the
costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to this section shall be set off against
the award.”153 When the court is determining whether to assess costs
against the defendant, “the term ‘judgment’ means the amount of the net
judgment entered, plus any postarbitration settlement amounts by which
the verdict was reduced.”154
Thus, Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedures clarify that, while
a nonbinding arbitration decision in Florida is not inherently binding, it
has the potential to become binding if the parties do not adhere to a set of
rather strict guidelines. Lawyers must pay close attention to procedural
rules to ensure that nonbinding arbitration does not actually bind the
parties.
B. The FAA Does Not Govern Florida’s Nonbinding
Arbitration Procedure
Based on the Eleventh Circuit’s standard for FAA arbitration in
Advanced Bodycare, nonbinding arbitration in Florida is not FAA
arbitration. This is true even though Florida’s nonbinding arbitration
meets three of the four factors of the Eleventh Circuit’s standard.
Nonbinding arbitration’s failure to meet the fourth factor—that the
dispute resolution procedure results in a final award—outweighs its
compliance with the first three factors of the Eleventh Circuit’s
standard.155
Nonbinding arbitration, as defined by Florida Statutes § 44.103, meets
three of the four factors of the Eleventh Circuit’s standard for FAA
arbitration. Nonbinding arbitration meets the first factor—that the
arbitration has an independent adjudicator156—because an independent
chief arbitrator runs nonbinding arbitration.157 It also meets the second
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. § 44.103(6)(b).
153. See id. § 44.103(6)(a)–(b).
154. Id. § 44.103(6)(b).
155. See Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th
Cir. 2008).
156. Id.
157. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(a) (“The chief arbitrator shall have authority to commence
and adjourn the arbitration hearing and carry out other such duties as are prescribed by section
44.103, Florida Statutes.”); see also FLA. STAT. § 44.103(4) (“Any party to the arbitration may
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factor—that the independent adjudicator apply substantive legal
standards158—because the chief arbitrator must apply substantive legal
standards in reaching the final arbitration decision.159 Finally, nonbinding
arbitration meets the third factor—that the chief arbitrator “consider[]
evidence and argument (however formally or informally) from each
party”160—because, although the process is informal, the arbitrator hears
arguments and accepts evidence from both parties.161
Although nonbinding arbitration meets the first three factors, it does
not meet the fourth factor—that the independent adjudicator “render[] a
decision that purports to resolve the rights and duties of the parties,
typically by awarding damages or equitable relief.”162 This is arguably
the most important factor, and, even though nonbinding arbitration in
Florida meets the first three factors, its failure to satisfy the fourth factor
strongly supports a conclusion that nonbinding arbitration is not FAA
arbitration.163 The remainder of this Section discusses the reasoning
behind that conclusion in more detail.
In Advanced Bodycare, the Eleventh Circuit decided that mediation
was not FAA arbitration. In making its decision, the Eleventh Circuit only
analyzed the fourth factor of its test—whether mediation “renders a
decision that purports to resolve the rights and duties of the parties.”164
Because mediation did not meet this factor, the Eleventh Circuit decided
that it was not FAA arbitration.165 By deciding the issue based solely on
the fourth factor, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the importance of this
factor and suggested that other courts could do the same regarding
nonbinding arbitration. The fact that many other authorities define
arbitration as a process that is final and binding also emphasizes the
fourth factor’s importance.166 Therefore, if nonbinding arbitration does
not “render[] a decision that purports to resolve the rights and duties of
petition the court in the underlying action, for good cause shown, to authorize the arbitrator to
issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, records, documents,
and other evidence at the arbitration and may petition the court for orders compelling such
attendance and production at the arbitration. Subpoenas shall be served and shall be enforceable
in the manner provided by law.”).
158. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239.
159. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(g)(3) (explaining that in its decision, the arbitrator may “set
forth the issues in controversy and the arbitrator(’s)(s’) conclusions and findings of fact and law”).
160. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239.
161. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820 (“The hearing shall be conducted informally. Presentation of
testimony shall be kept to a minimum, and matters shall be presented to the arbitrator(s) primarily
through the statements and arguments of counsel.”).
162. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239.
163. See id. (“Although we acknowledge that there are few clear rules in delineating the
bounds of FAA arbitration, we believe there is one that controls this case. The FAA clearly
presumes that arbitration will result in an ‘award’ declaring the rights and duties of the parties.”).
164. See id.
165. Id. at 1240.
166. See supra Section II.B.
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the parties,”167 courts should not classify it as FAA arbitration.
Although not as clearly as with mediation, Florida’s nonbinding
arbitration procedure does not “render[] a decision that purports to
resolve the rights and duties of the parties.”168 Unlike mediation, where
the mediator does not deliver a decision at the conclusion of the
mediation,169 in nonbinding arbitration, the arbitrator does deliver a
decision that may “set forth the issues in controversy and the
arbitrator(’s)(s’) conclusions and findings of fact and law.”170 While the
arbitrator technically “renders a decision,” that decision does not
“purport[] to resolve the rights and duties of the parties”171 because the
parties may move for a new trial within twenty days. If a party makes this
motion, then there will be a new trial and the arbitrator’s decision will
have absolutely no weight in the outcome of the case. Judges in the new
trial cannot even use the arbitration decision to guide their own decision
because they are forbidden from seeing the decision.172 The Florida
Statutes specifically state that “[t]he [nonbinding arbitration] decision
shall not be made known to the judge who may preside over the case
unless no request for trial de novo is made as herein provided or unless
otherwise provided by law.”173 Since the outcome of nonbinding
arbitration in Florida does not necessarily bind the parties, it is not a
dispute resolution procedure that purports to resolve the dispute. This
strongly suggests that nonbinding arbitration under Florida’s procedure
is not FAA arbitration.
The Eleventh Circuit’s bright-line rule regarding the fourth factor of
its standard further supports the conclusion that nonbinding arbitration is
not FAA arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit stated, “If a dispute resolution
procedure does not produce some type of award that can be meaningfully
confirmed, modified, or vacated by a court upon proper motion, it is not
arbitration within the scope of the FAA.”174 Based on this rule, Florida’s
nonbinding arbitration procedure is clearly not FAA arbitration because
nonbinding arbitration does not produce a final award.175
167. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1240.
170. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.820(g)(3).
171. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239.
172. FLA. STAT. § 44.103(5) (2013).
173. Id.
174. Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239.
175. Based on the bright-line rule set forth by the Eleventh Circuit regarding the fourth factor
of its test, it might seem that there is strong support for the conclusion that nonbinding arbitration
is within the scope of the FAA if one can prove, contrary to the arguments of this Note, that
nonbinding arbitration does in fact produce a final award. However, this is not true. Even if
nonbinding arbitration did meet the Eleventh Circuit’s bright-line rule, that does not necessarily
bring nonbinding arbitration within the scope of the FAA. The rule is one for determining whether
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The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning behind its bright-line rule further
supports the conclusion that nonbinding arbitration is not FAA
arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that a dispute resolution
procedure that fails to produce a meaningfully confirmable award is not
FAA arbitration because “[t]he purpose of the FAA is to ‘relieve
congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an alternative method
of dispute resolution that is speedier and less costly than litigation.’”176 If
a particular dispute resolution procedure does not produce an award that
can be meaningfully confirmed, then it is unlikely to alleviate congestion
in the courts or produce a speedier dispute resolution.177 That is because
any party that is unhappy with the award can just disregard it and take the
case to trial.178 If the dispute resolution procedure does not contribute to
the goals of the FAA, then it is simply illogical to think the FAA would
govern it.179
When analyzing nonbinding arbitration in Florida in the context of
this reasoning, it becomes abundantly clear that it is not FAA arbitration.
While nonbinding arbitration does produce an award that is technically
confirmable, it does not produce an award that is meaningfully
confirmable. This is because a party that is unhappy with the outcome of
the nonbinding arbitration can disregard the outcome and take the case to
trial by following some minor procedural requirements. Therefore, if a
party did not want to participate in nonbinding arbitration but had to do
so, this would actually increase the amount of time and money spent in
resolving the dispute.180 This result runs completely counter to the
intended purpose of the FAA. Thus, if a court construes nonbinding
arbitration as FAA arbitration, there is a very real possibility that it would
produce results opposite to Congress’s intent. The likelihood of such a
result clearly shows that nonbinding arbitration is not FAA arbitration.
FAA arbitration is meant to be “an alternative to litigation, not an
a procedure is not within the scope of the FAA; it is not meant to determine by itself whether a
particular dispute resolution procedure is arbitration within the scope of the FAA. The Eleventh
Circuit made this clear in a footnote of its opinion in Advanced Bodycare when it stated the
following about its bright-line rule: “The inverse is not true, however. The presence of an award
does not by itself make a procedure ‘arbitration’ if the procedures that produce the award bear no
resemblance to classic arbitration. The parties could not contract for a binding coin flip, with the
winner to receive an award of his choice, and expect the agreement to be enforced under the
FAA.” Advanced Bodycare, 524 F.3d at 1239 n.3.
176. Id. at 1239–40 (quoting AIG Baker Sterling Heights, LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc.,
508 F.3d 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 2007)).
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 1240 (“Unlike submitting a dispute to a private adjudicator, which the FAA
contemplates, compelling a party to submit to settlement talks it does not wish to enter and which
cannot resolve the dispute of their own force may well increase the time and treasure spent in
litigation.”).
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additional layer in a protracted contest.”181 However, nonbinding
arbitration is not a true alternative to litigation. If the parties must engage
in it against their wishes, then there is a significant possibility that it will
simply be “an additional layer in a protracted contest.” Therefore,
nonbinding arbitration in Florida is clearly not FAA arbitration.
C. Why All of This Matters
Determining whether Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure is
FAA arbitration is important for two reasons. First, nonbinding
arbitration is a relatively prevalent procedure in Florida. Therefore, courts
may have to address this issue one day. Second, the FAA’s governance
of Florida’s nonbinding arbitration procedure will significantly impact
the enforceability of contractual provisions in which the parties stipulate
nonbinding arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure.
1. The Prevalence of Nonbinding Arbitration in Florida
In Florida, parties can find themselves in nonbinding arbitration in a
number of ways. For one, the trial court may order parties to submit their
dispute to nonbinding arbitration before proceeding to a traditional
trial.182 Additionally, parties may contractually agree to submit disputes
to nonbinding arbitration before a traditional trial.183 Finally, various
Florida statutes may require parties involved in “disputes relating to
condominiums, cooperatives, homeowners associations, mobile home
park lot tenancies, medical malpractice, and sign owners” to submit their
disputes to nonbinding arbitration.184
Nonbinding arbitration appears to be prevalent in Florida’s
condominium industry as “[n]onbinding arbitration is a mandatory
condition precedent to maintaining a civil action in matters involving
certain disputes between condominium associations and unit owners.”185
Nonbinding arbitration also appears to be prevalent in cooperatives as
“[t]he law regarding mandatory nonbinding arbitration for disputes
involving cooperatives is the same for those related to condominiums.”186
It could also be prevalent in medical malpractice cases as “[a]ny party
can move for referral to nonbinding arbitration pursuant to [Florida
181. Id. at 1240 (quoting B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 907
(11th Cir. 2006), abrogation recognized by Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d 1195,
1197 (11th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. See FLA. STAT. § 44.103(2) (2013) (authorizing a court to “refer any contested civil
action filed in a circuit or county court to nonbinding arbitration”).
183. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.800 (“A civil action shall be ordered to arbitration or arbitration
in conjunction with mediation upon stipulation of the parties.”).
184. Morman & Whitcomb, supra note 124.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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Statutes § 766.107(1)].”187
2. The FAA’s Impact on Enforceability
Relying on the FAA, the Supreme Court has developed a strong policy
in favor of upholding agreements to arbitrate.188 The Court has stated that
the FAA reflects a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration[] and the
‘fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.’”189
Further, “[t]he overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to
facilitate streamlined proceedings.”190
Despite the arguably unconscionable nature of class arbitration
waivers, the U.S. Supreme Court has followed the FAA’s core principle
that courts should enforce arbitration agreements according to their
terms.191 On this basis, the Court has enforced class arbitration waivers
contained in consumer contracts.192 Enforcing arbitration in such a
situation exemplifies that when considering the validity of a particular
dispute resolution agreement under the FAA, courts will almost always
enforce the dispute resolution agreement. In other words, if parties make
a dispute resolution agreement and a court considers that dispute
resolution procedure to be arbitration within the scope of the FAA, the
court will almost always enforce the agreement.
For example, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,193 Vincent and
Liza Concepcion agreed to a cell phone service contract with AT&T.194
The contract contained a mandatory arbitration provision and a class
action waiver.195 Despite this waiver, the Concepcions filed a class action
suit in a federal district court in California.196 In response, AT&T moved
to compel arbitration.197 The Concepcions opposed AT&T’s motion,
citing to the saving clause in Section 2 of the FAA, which provides that
arbitration agreements can be unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist
187. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 766.107 (2013) (“In an action for recovery of damages based on the
death or personal injury of any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from
the negligence of a health care provider . . . the court may require, upon motion by either party,
that the claim be submitted to nonbinding arbitration.”).
188. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747–48 (2011) (noting
that the FAA preempts state-law rules eroding arbitration).
189. Id. at 1745 (citation omitted) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) and Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776
(2010)).
190. Id. at 1748.
191. See, e.g., id. at 1745–48.
192. See, e.g., id. at 1744–45, 1747–48, 1753.
193. 131 S. Ct. 1740.
194. Id. at 1744.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1744–45.
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at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”198 On the basis of
California’s Discover Bank rule,199 which “classif[ied] most collectivearbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable,”200 the
Concepcions argued
that the arbitration provision was
“unconscionable . . . under California law because it disallowed classwide
procedures.”201 Therefore, the Concepcions argued that the court should
not enforce the agreement.202 The district court agreed and denied
AT&T’s motion.203 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.204
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider “whether the FAA
prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration
agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures.”205
The Court held that “California’s Discover Bank rule [was] preempted by
the FAA,” thus upholding the validity of the class arbitration waiver.206
The Court reasoned that the Discover Bank rule was preempted because
it required the availability of classwide arbitration, which “interfere[d]
with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[d] a scheme
inconsistent with the FAA.”207
Since the Court’s decision in Concepcion, the Eleventh Circuit has
upheld the validity of a class action waiver in a similar contract with a
Florida consumer. In Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,208 Pendergast
agreed to several consecutive cell phone service contracts with Sprint.209
The contract at issue contained a mandatory arbitration provision, a class
action waiver, and a nonseverability clause that voided the arbitration
agreement if the court found that the class action waiver was
unenforceable.210 Pendergast filed a class action against Sprint in a
federal district court in Florida.211 In response, Sprint filed a motion to
compel arbitration.212 Pendergast argued that the class action waiver was
“unconscionable and unenforceable under Florida law,”213 and therefore,
198. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745, 1746.
199. The Discover Bank rule refers to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover
Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740.
200. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
201. Id. at 1745.
202. See id. at 1745–46.
203. Id. at 1745.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1744.
206. See id. at 1753.
207. Id. at 1748.
208. 691 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012).
209. Id. at 1226–28.
210. Id. at 1228.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1229.
213. Id.
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pursuant to the nonseverability clause, the arbitration provision did not
apply and the court should deny Sprint’s motion.214 The district court
disagreed and granted Sprint’s motion, finding that the class action
waiver and arbitration provisions in the contract were enforceable.215
Pendergast appealed and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s judgment granting Sprint’s motion to compel arbitration.216 In
response to Pendergast’s argument that the class action waiver was
unconscionable under Florida law, the Eleventh Circuit stated, “[W]e
need not reach the questions of whether Florida law would invalidate the
class action waiver in the parties’ contract because, to the extent it does,
it would be preempted by the FAA.”217 Further, the court noted that,
“[u]nder Concepcion, both the class action waiver and the arbitration
clause must be enforced according to their terms.”218
The decisions in both Concepcion and Pendergast reflect courts’
inclination to enforce FAA arbitration agreements. These decisions show
that courts will almost always enforce dispute resolution agreements that
provide for arbitration within the scope of the FAA. Thus, it is important
to determine whether nonbinding arbitration is within the scope of the
FAA because this determination will have a strong impact on the
enforceability of nonbinding arbitration agreements.
CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Advanced Bodycare provides the
most logical standard for determining whether a particular dispute
resolution procedure is FAA arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit’s standard
is most consistent with the FAA’s purposes. Since this is the most logical
standard, this Note uses it to determine whether Florida’s nonbinding
arbitration is FAA arbitration. Nonbinding arbitration in Florida does not
necessarily produce an award that is final and binding on the parties.
Therefore, under the Eleventh Circuit’s standard, Florida’s nonbinding
arbitration procedure is clearly not FAA arbitration.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id. at 1225.
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1236.
Id.
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